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Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the
Public Forum
Timothy Zick
I. INTRODUCTION
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum1 unanimously held that a city’s
decision to exclude a private religious monument offered by
adherents of the Summum religion from a municipal park was a form
of government speech exempt from Free Speech Clause scrutiny.
According to the Court, the Ten Commandments statue already
located on park grounds had been adopted by the city as its own
speech, thus negating any claim of content discrimination.2 With
regard to the acceptance and placement of permanent monuments,
the Court held that public forum principles were simply “out of
place.”3
If Summum were merely a holding regarding the placement of
permanent monuments in public parks, it would be rather
unremarkable. However, notwithstanding the Court’s denial that
public forum principles were at all implicated,4 the decision raises
important questions about the viability of the public forum concept
and about the balance of power and rights in public places.5
Summum is the first decision to hold that public forum principles are
“out of place” in a traditional public forum6—a place which has,
according to the Court, “time out of mind . . . been used for
 Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I would like to thank Joseph
Blocher for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this piece. I would also like to thank
the faculty and student organizers of the symposium for providing the opportunity to address
some of the emerging complexities of the government speech principle. Finally, I would like to
thank my research assistant, Chris Healy.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
2. Id. at 1129.
3. Id. at 1138.
4. Id. at 1137.
5. See Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 83 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/31/
LRColl2009n31Blocher.pdf (noting Summum’s possible effects in the intersection between
speech and property ownership).
6. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
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purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions.”7 It is also the first to treat a public
park as a channel of governmental as opposed to private speech. In
addition, Summum is arguably the first Supreme Court case to take
the vocality of public places—the manner in which they convey
meaning—seriously. Indeed Justice Alito’s opinion reads, in part, like
a graduate term paper on the communicative sociology of public
monuments and places. In that discussion, the Court indicates, again
for the first time, that parks and other public places may convey
governmental image or “identity” claims.8
Insofar as the result is concerned, the decision in Summum is
facially unassailable. Just imagine the chaos that would ensue if
governments were required to accept either all privately donated
monuments or none at all. I do not intend to challenge the result.
Rather, I want to focus on some of the broader implications of the
decision’s reasoning with regard to the concept of the public forum.
Summum suggests that government speakers occupy something of a
preferred position even in traditional public forums. This preferred
position may permit governments to demote and commandeer
portions of or perhaps entire public places like parks, plazas, and
streets.9 It may also allow officials to regulate or prohibit private
speech that is inconsistent with a governmental message conveyed in
a public place. Because it is ostensibly speaking, the government
need not comply with Free Speech Clause limits on subject matter
and viewpoint discrimination.10 Summum may allow these results
whether or not the governmental entity can identify the message it
seeks to convey to the public.11
This symposium contribution examines the additional layer of
complexity Summum adds to the government speech doctrine. It
pays particular attention to the decision’s potential implications with

7. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts,
J.).
8. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (noting that public parks “play an important role
in defining the identity that a city projects to its own residents and to the outside world”).
9. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
809 (2010) (arguing that government speech doctrine “is really a government speech forum
doctrine”).
10. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (noting that “the
Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”).
11. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 (“[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a single
‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure . . . .”).
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respect to the balance of power and rights in traditional public
forums such as parks, plazas, and streets. I argue that Summum’s
rationale is based upon a false equivalence between public and
private ownership, ignores the traditional functions of public forums,
and turns the fundamental premise of the public forum concept—
that public places like parks are held in trust by governments for the
benefit of the people—on its head.
Part II discusses the Court’s treatment of the public forum
doctrine and principles of private versus public ownership, and its
observations regarding the manner in which governments
communicate in and through public places.
Part III claims that the logic and rationale of Summum
undermine some of the fundamental premises of the public forum
concept. Based on public ownership principles, the decision
conceptualizes traditional public forums, such as parks, as channels of
governmental expression. Summum may permit demotion,
partitioning, and other forms of government control over public
forums. Perhaps most disturbingly, its logic suggests that public
forums may themselves constitute a form of government speech.
Part IV encourages courts and officials to resist some of the most
troubling implications of Summum. Courts are urged not to displace
public forum principles by expanding the already uncertain domain
of the government speech immunity. For all of its many faults, the
public forum doctrine, unlike the government speech absolute
immunity, at least offers some constraints on official subject matter
and viewpoint discrimination.12 It is also vitally important that courts
continue to press government officials to identify the content of their
purported messages in public places and that they expressly reject the
notion that public places are themselves a form of government
speech. Finally, I argue that characterizing cases like Summum as
government speech disputes merely obscures the fact that public
properties are being manipulated and partitioned in order to settle
underlying constitutional contests regarding expressive and religious
liberties. The critical question to ask is whether such settlements are
consistent with the neutrality and other constitutional duties officials
owe the public as trustees of the contested public places.13 Part V
briefly concludes.
12. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(setting forth standards for regulations in traditional, designated, and non-public forums).
13. See Timothy Zick, Property As/And Constitutional Settlement, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
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II. PUBLIC PLACES, GOVERNMENT SPEAKERS, AND SPATIAL
VOCALITY
In previous cases, the Supreme Court had applied government
speech doctrine, rather than public forum doctrine, primarily in
public spaces in which governments controlled the purse strings or
purported to make editorial decisions with respect to private
speech.14 Summum is the first case to hold that the government
speech doctrine displaces the public forum doctrine in a “traditional”
public forum. As noted, these are public places such as parks and
streets which have “time out of mind” been open to private speech
and assembly.15 Although the Court concluded that the public forum
doctrine was not applicable in Summum, several of its statements and
observations could substantially affect public forum principles and
private speech rights in public places.16
A. When Is a Public Park Not a Traditional Public Forum?
In Summum, the Court began by purporting to pay homage to
the fundamental principles of the public forum doctrine. The
government, it said, “does not have a free hand to regulate private
speech on government property.”17 The Court acknowledged that
“members of the public have strong free speech rights when they
venture into public streets and parks.”18 These places, said the Court,
are quintessential public forums, “which have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”19 In these and
other public places that “share essential attributes of a traditional

(forthcoming 2010).
14. See Johanns, 544 U.S. 550 (agricultural marketing campaign); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (student activities fund); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (regulations prohibiting federal fund recipients from
advocating, counseling, or referring patients for abortion); see also Ark. Educ. Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (applying government speech principle in somewhat
more tangible context of a public candidate debate).
15. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts,
J.).
16. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137.
17. Id. at 1132.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515).
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public forum,” governments are strictly limited in their ability to
regulate private speech.20
This assumes, however, that a public park is always a traditional
public forum. Prior to Summum, that was a fair assumption. The
Court had never indicated otherwise. According to the Summum
Court, public parks remain traditional public forums insofar as
“speeches and other transitory expressive acts” are concerned.21 But,
said the Court, with regard to publicly commissioned monuments,
or private ones that are “adopted” by government officials, public
forum principles are simply “out of place.”22 Justice Alito explained:
“Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to the end
of their remarks; persons distributing leaflets and carrying signs at
some point tire and go home; monuments, however, endure. They
monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere
permanently with other uses of public space.”23 Owing to this
scarcity issue, and to the fact that governments, under traditional
public forum rules, would face the untenable choice of either
accepting all privately donated monuments or declining to display
any at all, the Court concluded that the public forum doctrine did
not apply.24
To be sure, this was not the first time the Court had displaced
the public forum doctrine. But to hold that public forum principles
are “out of place” in, for example, a public library setting is quite a
bit different from holding that they are “out of place” in a public
park.25 How can the concept of the public forum be “out of place”
in the very place that gave rise to it? How can a public park be a
traditional public forum for some but not all purposes?
One might observe that the Court had previously held in United
States v. Kokinda that not all public sidewalks are necessarily
traditional public forums.26 If a sidewalk can be something other
than a traditional public forum, then why can not the same be true
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1129.
22. Id. at 1137 (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205
(2003)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1138.
25. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205 (holding that public forum principles are
“out of place” in the context of public library selection policies).
26. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (holding that sidewalk
leading from parking lot to front door of post office is not a traditional public forum).
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of a public park? Kokinda was based on an examination of the actual
functioning of the public sidewalk at issue, rather than the fact that
the government held title to it and was itself a speaker there. The
sidewalk served primarily governmental purposes. By contrast, the
public park in Summum retained its character as a public park and
did not cease functioning as a public forum. According to the Court,
however, the park was not a public forum insofar as the erection of
public monuments was concerned.
On its face, the permanent-transitory distinction the Summum
Court draws is both pragmatic and defensible. Surely members of the
public have no right to insist that their monuments, religious statues,
and other cultural artifacts be placed in the nation’s public parks.
Just imagine the monumental free-for-all that would follow.27 But
the Court has seemingly rejected the permanent-transitory
distinction in at least one other instance.28 Moreover, as we shall see,
there is no assurance that lower courts will limit Summum’s effect to
permanent monuments. Speakers come in varying degrees of longwindedness, and some pamphleteers are quicker to tire than others.
At what point on the spectrum does speech become permanent?
The Court’s reliance on a scarcity or “rivalrousness” rationale is
also somewhat suspect. After all, similar concerns arise whenever
there are more potential speakers than space.29 The analysis in
Summum also obscures the potential dominance of the government
speaker. In non-elastic markets, Summum grants the government an
immunity to suppress private speech that is inconsistent with its
own.30 As the Court noted, Summum did not involve any dispute
regarding whether the government was itself speaking or was instead
providing a forum for private speech.31 Nor did it involve any effort
by the city to restrict protesters, pamphleteers, or other private
speakers in the public park in order to preserve or defend its
message.32 In sum, although it was clear that the government had
27. One is of course forced to imagine it, since prior to Summum this does not seem to
have been a local or national problem of any pressing importance.
28. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)
(holding that city’s restriction on permanent commercial newsracks on public sidewalks was an
impermissible content-based restriction on speech).
29. See Blocher, supra note 5, at 89–90 (discussing elasticity of speech markets and
rivalrousness).
30. See id.
31. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).
32. Id. at 1135.
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officially entered the traditional public forum, the Court did not
elaborate on the effect its presence and voice might have on the
rights of private speakers (other than those seeking to donate
monuments).
Moreover, prior to Summum, courts relied on public forum
principles to resolve disputes regarding access to the public
commons. In previous cases in which speakers sought to engage in
less transitory displays in public parks, the Court never suggested
that public forum and time, place, and manner principles were “out
of place.” Rather, it had allowed officials to grant or deny permits,
on a content-neutral basis, when speakers sought overnight or more
permanent access to public places.33 Further, even if it was not a
traditional public forum for purposes of monumental speech, the
park might have been characterized as a limited public forum in
which discrimination based upon speaker identity (but not
viewpoint) could be relied upon to resolve access claims.34
The point of this discussion is, again, not to challenge the result
in Summum, but to elaborate upon and begin to critically engage
the Court’s reasoning. Without apparent irony, the Court held for
the first time that public forum principles were “out of place” in the
very spaces in which the concept of the public forum itself
originated.35 “Long-winded” speakers, persistent pamphleteers, and
other transitory actors are apparently still welcome in the park, so
long as they comply with rules and regulations regarding the time,
place, and manner of speech and assembly there. But it is no longer
safe to assume that a public park is a traditional public forum for all
purposes. The Court concluded that “the placement of a permanent
monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government
speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause.”36

33. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding
Park Service regulation prohibiting overnight camping on National Mall and Lafayette Park).
34. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(recognizing that a forum may be “created for a limited purpose,” and that “[i]mplicit in the
concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of
subject matter and speaker identity”). But see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1757
(1987) (criticizing concept of the limited public forum).
35. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
36. Id. at 1129.
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B. The Government, Like Any Private Owner of Property?
In Commonwealth v. Davis,37 then-judge Oliver Wendell Holmes
upheld a refusal to allow a speech on Boston Common on the
ground that the state, like any private owner, may refuse to permit
expressive activities on land it owned. Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, which was the impetus for the modern
public forum doctrine, rejected the premise that the government was
like any private owner in this respect. With regard to public
properties such as Boston Common, the famous dictum in Hague
stated that, wherever title to them might lie, such places have been
used “time out of mind . . . for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”38 Public parks, streets, and similar places such as
sidewalks were henceforth to be held “in trust” by the government
for the benefit of private speakers.39
Various marginalized speakers and groups used these places to
make identity claims, engage in self-governance, and participate in
public debates.40 Harry Kalven, Jr. declared during the civil rights era
that the public streets and other forums had been
“commandeer[ed]” by the people for the cause of equality.41 As it
turns out, Kalven was overly optimistic. The idea that the
government, like any private owner of property, may determine who
may speak on “its” property was never completely eradicated from
what would eventually become the public forum doctrine. Indeed it
surfaced on occasion during the civil rights struggle itself. For
example, in a case upholding a conviction for trespass on a driveway
next to a local jail where protesters alleged political prisoners were
being held, the Court, through Justice Black, stated: “The State, no
less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.”42
37.
38.
39.
40.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895).
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
Id.
See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 42–53 (2009) (describing use of streets, sidewalks, and parks
from the early twentieth century through the civil rights era).
41. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, at 11–12.
42. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
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Although Summum did not cite this precedent, its analysis seems
to be based in substantial part upon an extension of its reasoning.
Because Pleasant Grove City possessed title to the park, the Court
concluded that it was not obligated to accept any private
monuments. This was so because “[i]t certainly is not common for
property owners to open up their property for the installation of
permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do
not wish to be associated.”43 In other words the city, like any other
property owner, was not obliged to accept all monuments offered to
it. We can probably stipulate that it is not at all common for private
property owners to install permanent monuments of the sort at issue
in Summum, or to be faced with requests by strangers that they do
so. In any event, it is clear that as your neighbor I have no right to
demand that you display on your front lawn my New Orleans Saints
flag, or the campaign signage of my preferred candidate, or some
work of art I created from scrap metal in my garage.
Summum treats the government’s newfound exclusionary right
as an uncontroversial extension of public control over public
properties. However, the government had never formally been
granted such authority. As the Court well knows, government
owners are not like other property owners in significant respects.
Although a speaker can claim special access rights with regard to
public properties such as parks, he has no expressive easement or
right of access with respect to private properties.44 It has long been
understood that the Free Speech Clause is not implicated when my
neighbor refuses to install my proffered scrap metal masterpiece. By
contrast, prior to Summum it appeared that the government could
not refuse private speech based on its content in places such as public
parks and plazas.45 Nor, unlike a public owner, is a private property
owner required to comply with the Establishment Clause, the Due
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or any other public
constitutional obligation.

43. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009) (emphasis added).
44. Unless, that is, a state law or constitution requires such compliance. See, e.g.,
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding California
constitutional provisions permitting individuals to exercise speech and petition rights on
privately owned property).
45. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995)
(holding that government could not refuse to accept private speech for temporary display once
it had opened a forum for speech on public property).
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In sum, state action, public forum, and government speech
principles mark some rather obvious and important differences
between private and public owners and speakers. The Court’s publicprivate ownership analogy suggests that there is nothing new or
extraordinary involved in allowing governments to exclude private
speech based on its content. To the contrary, the ownership analogy
cuts to the heart of the public forum concept. It raises important
questions regarding the degree of control officials may exercise over
private speech when unconstrained by Free Speech Clause
safeguards.
C. The Vocality of Public Places
As commentators have observed, “one of the important uses of
government property [is] communication by the government of its
own messages.”46 Indeed, governments routinely communicate in
public places. Much of this communication is instrumental or has a
regulatory function. Municipalities convey basic information and
instructions with regard to public order and safety. For example,
speed limit and stop signs are technically forms of government
speech that communicate directions and instructions to the public.
Governments also convey local historical and other information to
help guide visitors.
Further, through the manner in which they regulate, manage,
and even construct public properties, governments can convey broad
themes such as power, commercialization, or disapproval of public
contention and dissent.47 For example, structures that are built to
house and regulate private speakers in public places, such as pens and
cages (“free speech zones”) communicate something about state
power and the status of those confined inside.48 Business districts
convey an image of commercial opportunity and financial success. In
sum, governments use public places to convey both specific and
more general messages, often in the interest of assisting, guiding,
informing and regulating the public.
The official speech at issue in Summum was of a unique
character. The individual monuments the city had accepted for

46. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1406 (2001).
47. See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 637–38 (2006).
48. Id.
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display, like many that municipalities have commissioned or erected,
were not text-based. This made the interpretive analysis much more
challenging.49 The Court nevertheless proceeded to identify what I
will call adoption, exclusion, and identity forms of government
speech. It is important to separate these various forms. Although
each carries some power to displace or suppress private voices or
messages, the nature and extent of that power differ depending on
the form of government speech.
1. Adoption
Official adoption of a private monument or other item may
communicate a specific message.50 As the Summum Court noted,
“[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the
public.”51 Whether they are erecting publicly commissioned and
financed monuments or accepting privately donated ones, the Court
concluded that governments are thereby engaging in expressive
conduct.52 It observed that donated monuments on private property
are “routinely–and reasonably” interpreted as conveying the owner’s
messages.53 “This is true,” the Court claimed, “whether the
monument is located on private property or on public property, such
as national, state, or city park land.”54 Under this analysis,
communication via private and public properties essentially follows
the same path: expression can be traced to location, which in turn
signifies ownership, which in turn evinces power to include or
exclude, which communicates something to the public at large. Like
the private property owner, the governmental owner is presumed to
own not just the property itself but everything permanently (or at
least non-transitorily) on the property.
But if, as the Court held, the government is not required to
formally adopt, explain, or validate the item, how do we determine

49. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009) (noting the
additional difficulties that may attend interpretation of non-text-based monuments).
50. Of course, governments can also independently commission and display their own
monuments, statues, and artifacts. The government speech principle applies to these items in
the same manner. See id. at 1133 (noting that “government-commissioned and governmentfinanced monuments speak for the government”).
51. Id. at 1132.
52. Id. at 1136.
53. Id. at 1133.
54. Id.
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the content of the government’s message?55 With regard to adoption
of the private monuments already in the park, including the Ten
Commandments statue, Justice Alito offered this explanation
regarding “the way monuments convey meaning”56:
Even when a monument features the written word, the monument
may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted
by different observers, in a variety of ways. Monuments called to
our attention by the briefing in this case illustrate this
phenomenon. What, for example, is “the message” of the GrecoRoman mosaic of the word “Imagine” that was donated to New
York City’s Central Park in memory of John Lennon? Some
observers may “imagine” the musical contributions that John
Lennon would have made if he had not been killed. Others may
think of the lyrics of the Lennon song that obviously inspired the
mosaic and may “imagine” a world without religion, countries,
possessions, greed, or hunger.57

The Court concluded that by adopting or erecting a statue or
monument and placing it in a public place, a governmental entity
thereby engaged in symbolic conduct.58 But at the same time, it
noted that public monuments are variable and polysemous; thus,
they may have no single identifiable message, and their meaning may
change over time and depending on the specific audience.59
Moreover, Justice Alito wrote, “the thoughts or sentiments
expressed by a government entity that accepts and displays such an
object may be quite different from those of either its creator or its
donor. . . . By accepting such a monument a government entity does
not necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular
donor sees in the monument.”60 In sum, the point of the Court’s
ode to Lennon’s “Imagine” seems to be that government speakers
are entitled to the absolute immunity of the government speech
principle whether or not they can identify any specific message.61
Putting aside for the moment the problem with applying
government speech immunity absent an identifiable message, the
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 1136.
Id.
Id.
Justice Alito quoted the lyrics to the song. Id. at 1135 n.2.
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manner in which public places convey meaning is more complex than
the Court acknowledges. According to the Summum Court’s logic,
just as a “Bring Our Troops Home” sign in a private homeowner’s
front yard will be “routinely–and reasonably–interpret[ed]” as
conveying the owner’s message, so too will any sign, monument, or
other permanent display in a public park automatically be attributed
to the city or town.62
It seems likely that private yard signs and the like will
automatically be attributed to homeowners or businesses.63 But the
extrapolation of that communicative principle to government speech
in public places assumes, for one thing, that the lines of public and
private property are always clearly drawn. That is an increasingly
questionable assumption, at best, given the rise in privatization of
once-public spaces, including parks. It also assumes that the public
views parks and other places just as the Court does—namely as
canvases upon which governments convey messages to the public
rather than public forums through which the collective sentiments of
individuals are conveyed to government officials.
Is it so clear, for example, that an iconic monument such as the
Lincoln Memorial conveys a governmental message? Is the National
Mall, where the monument is located, a sacred place inscribed with
individual memories and messages, or a parcel of land upon which
the national government conveys various messages to the people?64
Does a local war memorial or other display necessarily convey some
governmental message simply because it is placed on land for which
the municipality holds title? Similarly, to use one of the Court’s own
examples, is it so clear that the “Imagine” display in Central Park
conveys a governmental message to the public? Given that many
public monuments are erected with the sometimes substantial
financial and other support of private parties, is it accurate to label all
of this speech “governmental”?65
62. Id. at 1133.
63. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) (noting that residential yard
signs are a “unique and important” means of private expression); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 408 (1974) (noting that state did not contest the fact that display of flag with peace
symbol affixed thereto from apartment window conveyed message of protest against invasion
of Cambodia and killings at Kent State University).
64. See ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 40, ch. 6 (discussing “sacred” places
like the National Mall and Central Park).
65. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (arguing that “much speech is the joint
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The Court’s response to the message problem—that symbols are
often polysemous—is hardly controversial.66 Indeed the answer
would be perfectly acceptable in sociology classes or academic
analyses of spatial vocality. But given the absolute immunity that is
riding on this determination, one would expect some level of
precision in the identification of the actual message of adoption. To
state the obvious, if the government is allowed to define and even
alter the meaning of its speech in a public forum and to distance
itself from any private donors, how are we to know whether it is
engaging in an unconstitutional ruse or some form of meaningful
communication?
In Summum, the obvious peril in forcing the municipality to
expressly adopt the Ten Commandments monument is that this may
constitute an endorsement of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Court sought to avoid that result by
refusing to identify what precisely is communicated by the official act
of adoption. Instead it reasoned that adoption communicates
something, and that this is sufficient to trigger the government
speech immunity. A private speaker seeking access to a public park
who made these same arguments would not likely be able to mount
a successful First Amendment challenge.67 More to the point, as
Stephen Gey has asked, why should we bother to recognize and
protect government speech in this or any other context if the
government in fact has nothing to say?68
The debate regarding the way monuments convey meaning is
not purely theoretical. If we are to accept Summum’s adoption
principle, several constitutional obligations might be skirted or
negated in public places. By describing the message of the Ten
Commandments monument as variable, polysemous, and not
necessarily that of its donor, the Court suggests that even a sectarian
symbol may be adopted without violating the Establishment Clause.
Nor, contrary to Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion, is it clear that
production of both government and private speakers and exists somewhere along a continuum,
with pure private speech and pure government speech at each end”).
66. See generally Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning:
Toward a First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261 (2004).
67. Cf. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (requiring, for symbolic conduct to be eligible for
Free Speech Clause protection, “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and a great
likelihood “that the message would be understood by those who viewed it”).
68. See, e.g., Stephen Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech
When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259 (2010).
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governments will be denied “free license to communicate offensive
or partisan messages” in public places.69 Based upon Summum’s
logic, a municipality might be able to skirt Equal Protection Clause
concerns regarding the adoption of racially charged symbols by
claiming to reject the donor’s intended message, while refusing to
identify any clear message of its own. Presumably, it would then be
up to the people to discern whether the message was one of racial
hatred or something else. If the municipality is not required to
identify a particularized message, how are the people to know
whether to be offended and object, to agree with the government’s
sentiment, or simply to ask for clarification?
Finally, it is also far from clear what, in addition to permanent
monuments, may be swept into the government speech category
under the adoption principle. One recent case, Liberty and Prosperity
1776, Inc. v. Corzine,70 involved a free speech claim alleging that
private speakers opposed to the governor’s debt reduction plan were
denied an opportunity to make their views known at a town hall
meeting convened to discuss the plan, while supporters were
permitted to speak. The Summum opinion was issued after the
district court heard oral arguments on the governor’s motion to
dismiss the viewpoint discrimination claim. With regard to
Summum’s possible impact on that claim, the court characterized the
decision as raising a “threshold question in many First Amendment
cases, including, potentially, this case—namely, is the speech in
question government speech, which is not subject to Free Speech
Clause scrutiny, or private speech, to which Free Speech Clause
protections attach?”71 The court declined to address the impact of
Summum further but stated that, should the governor renew his
motion to dismiss, he ought to clarify whether the speech of private
groups that were permitted to speak in favor of his budget plan at
the town hall meeting “constituted government or private speech.”72
Like the permanent monuments in Summum, perhaps even the
speech of private citizens at a town hall meeting could be
characterized as an adopted governmental message.
69. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
70. Liberty & Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. Corzine, Civil No. 08-2642 (JBS), 2009 WL
537049 (D.N.J. March 3, 2009).
71. Id. at *8.
72. Id. at *9.
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2. Exclusion
An official message might also be communicated through a
government’s rejection of proffered private monuments or other
speech. In Summum, the Court indicated that like a private owner of
property, a municipality is not required to accept a donated
monument with which it does not wish to be associated.73 With
regard to donated monuments, the Court observed that
municipalities had a history of exercising “selective receptivity” and
editorial control in parks and other public places.74
Adoption and exclusion are sometimes simply two sides of the
same coin. Just as a private homeowner may suggest disapproval of
other candidates by placing a favored candidate’s campaign sign on
his lawn, public officials may send a message of disapproval-byrejection. Explicit rejection, by contrast, could land a municipality in
hot water. In Summum the city never stated that it was in fact
rejecting the Summum monument based upon any disagreement
with the substance of its message. Rather, it initially based its
decision not to accept the statue on the fact that it did not relate to
the history of Pleasant Grove and was not donated by a group with
“longstanding ties” to the community.75 Although the Court
suggested that a government speaker would be privileged to reject a
monument or other symbol owing to disagreement with its message,
the municipality was not making that explicit claim in Summum. If it
had done so, Pleasant Grove City would presumably have had to
explain how it could expressly disavow the proffered Summum
monument, accept the Ten Commandments monument, and still
comply with the anti-endorsement principle.
In any event, the Court does not explain how anyone, including
the putative donor, will know what message rejection conveys absent
some explanation from officials. In many cases, rejection might just
as well convey lack of space or other resources as disapproval of
content. Here, again, the government speaker is being given the
benefit of an absolute Free Speech Clause immunity without any
requirement that a distinct and particularized message—this time of
disapproval—be identified.

73. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1130.
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3. Governmental identity claims
According to the Summum Court, there was a third sense in
which the municipality could be said to have communicated its
message—this time not in but through the channel of the public
park.76 Specifically, the Court suggested that the park property itself
may communicate a message on behalf of the government. Justice
Alito wrote:
Public parks are often closely identified in the public mind with the
government unit that owns the land. City parks—ranging from those
in small towns, like Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, to those in
major metropolises, like Central Park in New York City—
commonly play an important role in defining the identity that a city
projects to its own residents and to the outside world.77

According to the Court, the public park itself may be thought to
communicate a distinct message regarding “the image of the City
that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park.”78 The Court
observed that the city had taken ownership of several donated items
and had placed them “on permanent display in a park that it owns
and manages and that is linked to the City’s identity.”79
It is not entirely clear whether Justice Alito meant to link the
identity function with the adoption or exclusion functions
mentioned above, or whether it is a separate form of government
speech. Although one hesitates to read too much into a somewhat
free wheeling discussion of the vocality of monuments and public
places, it is worth noting that Justice Alito made the identity point
on four separate occasions in a relatively brief opinion.80 Thus, it
certainly appears that the Court viewed the city as conveying not
merely or solely a specific monument-oriented message, but a more
holistic identity or image through the public park itself. As
commentators have noted, in metaphysical forums “almost anything
can be either the locus of individual speech opportunity or the
manifestation of government speech.”81 Summum indicates that this
principle might extend to physical public forums such as parks.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 1133–34.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1134.
Id.
Id. at 1133–34.
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 46, at 1407.
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As the discussion thus far demonstrates, reading or interpreting
the vocality of public places is a complicated endeavor. In prior cases
the Supreme Court was generally faced with funds or governmental
programs which, largely through their limitations and selection
processes, communicated some governmental message of approval or
disapproval of private speech. Discerning a governmental message in
a metaphysical forum that is specifically designed to communicate
“family planning” or “pro-beef” messages is far different from
discerning the message of a public monument, a collection of
monuments, or an entire public park.82
There is, of course, no question that governmental entities
generally take pride in their parks and other public places. Wellmaintained public parks and plazas are often identified as municipal
accomplishments and tourist attractions. In a broad sense, some such
places may be symbols of responsiveness to community needs, public
investment in infrastructure, or support for public recreational and
other activities. New York City’s image is indeed partly bound to its
great parks, including Central Park.
However, a jurisprudential rule treating public places like parks
as channels for official identity claims runs counter to, and may well
interfere with, the traditional identity functions of these places. The
expressiveness of public places has arisen primarily from the uses to
which public properties have been put by the people, not by their
elected officials. Throughout American history public places such as
parks and streets have been critical sociological, political, and
expressive resources for speakers, pamphleteers, proselytizers, and
dissidents of all stripes.83
To a speaker intent on conveying a public message, such places
are primary to expressive rights; they can often be as critical to a
speaker’s expressive experience as voice, sight, and auditory
function.84 Thus, a protest on Main Street is not the same as one on
a side street; a demonstration on the National Mall is not the same as
one in a local public plaza; and a sidewalk next to an abortion clinic
82. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991) (explaining that the purpose of
the federal funding program was to convey information regarding family planning, not prenatal
care and abortion); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005) (analyzing
government speech in the context of the well-known advertising message “Beef. It’s What’s for
Dinner.”).
83. See generally ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 40.
84. See id. at 8–12 (discussing the expressiveness of place, as experienced by private
speakers).
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is not the same as one in the center of town. On a deeper level,
people, not governments, experience social and personal connections
to public places. With regard to certain places, they develop what
one human geographer calls “topophilia”—an affinity for and
connection to place.85 By contrast, governments’ primary interests in
public places have always been and remain primarily regulatory and
managerial. Insofar as governments have distinctly expressive
interests in public properties, including the nation’s streets and parks,
they are quite different from, and secondary to, private individuals’
First Amendment interests in speech, assembly, and petition.
In addition to their sociological functions, for individuals and
assemblies, public places also serve a variety of broader democratic
functions.86 They allow individuals and groups to make specific
identity claims—to be publicly present and counted by one another
and by authorities.87 Thus, presence in a public place is itself an
expressive claim to political identity. It is a form of
“representation.”88 Further, public places like parks and streets are
“theatrical” in the sense that they are places within “which [one] is
seen and shows oneself [off] to others.”89 Throughout American
history, beggars, proselytizers, leafletters, protestors, and a host of
others have relied upon public places to make identity and
representational claims.
Owing to their special character, traditional public forums such
as parks and streets serve other unique communicative functions as
well. Anthropologists and geographers have referred to the process
of “inscription,” or the manner in which “people form meaningful
relationships with the locales they occupy, how they attach meaning
to space, and transform ‘space’ into ‘place.’”90 Through inscription,
experiences are “embedded in place.”91 A public place often “holds
memories that implicate people and events.”92 Inscription may occur
85. YI-FU TUAN, TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION,
ATTITUDES, AND VALUES (1974).
86. See ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 40, at 13–19 (describing the
democratic functions of public places).
87. Id. at 13–15.
88. DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 33–36 (2005).
89. PUBLIC SPACE AND DEMOCRACY 5 (Marcel Henaff & Tracy B. Strong eds., 2001).
90. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 13 (Setha M.
Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga eds., 2003).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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physically, as when graffiti artists mark a public place. It is also a
broader experiential phenomenon by which certain public places
serve as “centers of . . . human significance and emotional
attachment.”93 Through the process of inscription, by which peoples’
experiences are literally and figuratively written into spaces, public
streets and parks may come to define our neighborhoods and
communities.94 In this respect, iconic places like the National Mall in
Washington, D.C. and Central Park in Manhattan serve as mass
cultural repositories.
To be sure, not all public parks and streets are inscribed in this
sense. Many public streets, sidewalks, and parks are either uninscribed or express very little beyond the basic facts of their names
and locations. The essential point is that public places have
historically been open to inscription, and in many cases have actually
been inscribed by individual speakers and assemblies. That does not
mean that governments have no stake in the images these places
convey to the public. But it is another thing entirely to recognize—
and indeed give preemptive effect to—governmental identity claims
in parks and other public places. The local and national histories
inscribed on the National Mall and in other sacred places in some
sense belong to the people who participated in and witnessed the
demonstrations and other events there.95 It is their identity claims we
ought to be concerned about preserving.
Officials and members of the public have long fought over who
owns and controls public places, including public parks. However,
the idea that the venues communicate some message on behalf of
governments has no support in free speech history or jurisprudence.
To be sure, courts have recognized that governments have important
interests in maintaining public safety, order, and aesthetic beauty in
public places. But in none of the debates and contests involving
traditional public forums did anyone ever suggest that Boston
Common, Central Park, the National Mall, or any other public place
make identity claims on behalf of governments. If indeed these and
other public places are all potential canvases for governmental

93. Id. at 228.
94. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
(1961).
95. ROY ROSENZWEIG & ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, THE PARK AND THE PEOPLE: A
HISTORY OF CENTRAL PARK (1992); CHRISTOPHER TILLEY, A PHENOMENOLOGY OF
LANDSCAPE: PLACES, PATHS AND MONUMENTS (1994).
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speech, then it is possible that anything that is done in those places
will either have to conform to the government’s identity and image
or be subject to exclusion.
III. SUMMUM AND THE DEGRADATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM
The space available for exercise of private speech rights in public
forums has steadily declined over the past several decades.96 Among
other things, officials have privatized, regulated, and beautified
public parks and other places in ways that have diminished
opportunities for speech and assembly in these critical democratic
spaces. Although it did not do so intentionally or directly, the
Summum Court may nevertheless have inflicted further damage on
the already substantially degraded concept of the public forum.
A. “Public” Forums
The very manner in which the Court conceptualized the public
park and the speech that takes place there suggests further
degradation of the public forum. More than eighty years after Hague
identified public parks as quintessential forums for public debate and
assembly, the Court held that a public park was, at least for some
purposes, a channel of government speech. As I noted earlier, there
is no question that governments communicate in places like public
parks. However, building on my prior observations regarding
identity claims, these forums are labeled “public” not because
government speakers have a right to communicate there but because
the people do. To treat a public park, or at least a portion of it, as a
governmental forum in some sense turns this conception on its head.
As Hague suggested and numerous subsequent cases have
affirmed, places like public parks are vitally important “for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”97 Among these most vital functions,
governments can arguably perform only the last. However, it is far
from clear based on the record in Summum that Pleasant Grove City
was in any sense engaged in a discussion of public questions. Indeed,
the Court stated that the city was not ultimately required to identify,
much less explain, its message. The private speaker must generally

96. See generally ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 40.
97. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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demonstrate both intent to communicate a message and the
likelihood that an audience will understand what is being said.98
Conversely, the governmental speaker is not required to make any
such demonstration. The park belongs to it, and ownership
apparently has its privileges.
The Court’s focus on legal ownership and title also suggests a
troubling turn insofar as the concept of the public forum is
concerned. The Court has already interpreted public forum
principles such that governments have a substantial degree of
managerial deference.99 Governmental entities are generally
permitted to determine which public properties will be open to
public speech and assembly, to regulate the time, place, and manner
of such activities, and to sell, close, or even demolish public forum
properties.100 However, between Hague and Summum, the Supreme
Court refrained from explicitly comparing public ownership of
traditional speech forums like parks with private ownership. Instead,
it consistently invoked principles of public “trust,” property
management, and proprietorship when discussing public forum
properties.101
Granted, the Summum Court’s discussion was premised on the
notion that the park is not a public forum at all with regard to the
government’s speech. But this demotion or partitioning of the public
park itself suggested a change in judicial attitude with regard to the
public forum. In defending the principle of immunity of government
speech, the Court characterized the public forum owner as literally
just like any private owner of property. As Justice Stevens described
the dispute in Summum: “This case involves a property owner’s
rejection of an offer to place a permanent display on its land.”102 Not

98. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
99. See generally Post, supra note 34.
100. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
101. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (stating that certain public properties are held “in trust”
for the benefit of the people); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296
(1984) (noting that the Court’s decisions do not “assign to the judiciary the authority to
replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the
competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of
conservation is to be attained”).
102. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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just a property owner, of course—and not just any ordinary parcel
either.
Although, again, one hesitates to read too much into the
language the Court used, a vision of expressive activity in the park
begins nonetheless to emerge. In defense of its proposed transitorypermanent distinction, the Court noted that even the “long-winded”
speaker and the most persistent marchers and pamphleteers will
eventually (thank goodness) tire and go home.103 Permanent
government speech, however, will endure—hence the need to carve
out a special place for it. The Court did not mention, of course, the
obvious fact that the long-winded speaker and persistent
demonstrator are not permitted to remain in the park beyond their
officially allotted times. Government speakers can maintain a
permanent presence in the park owing to the fact that they exercise
ownership and control over the place.
We shall have to wait to see whether the private ownership
analogy and other aspects of the government speech approach will
have any effect on lower courts’ adjudication of private speech rights
in public forums. As I discuss below, there is already some evidence
that this concern is not entirely unwarranted.
B. Regulation by Demotion and Partition
With ownership, of course, comes a certain measure of control.
Not merely the control that accompanies adoption, exclusion and
the making of identity claims—although these are hardly
insignificant. Rather, ownership may entail broader powers of
demotion, partition, and regulation of private speech in public
forums.
Prior to Summum, the Court had held that governments could
not by regulatory fiat or ipse dixit alter or demote the status of a
traditional public forum.104 After Summum, officials may be able to
reach the same result through application of the government speech
principle. There is no limitation in the decision’s holding or logic
relating to the government’s own ability to clutter a public space
with commissioned or adopted structures.105 It is not necessary that
103. Id. at 1137 (majority opinion).
104. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (“Nor may the government
transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory
definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property.”).
105. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141–42 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that
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officials occupy the entire space in order to have a substantial effect
on private speech rights. The mere introduction of government
speech into the traditional public forum appears to present a court
with a conceptual choice: namely, to apply either public forum or
government speech principles. As discussed below, and particularly in
situations where the public place is said to convey a governmental
image or identity claim, a public forum may be demoted to a mere
public space in which governments select speech unencumbered by
Free Speech Clause limitations.
If not an outright demotion, Summum may support a kind of
public place partitioning. Even if the traditional public forum
remains such insofar as more transient speakers are concerned, those
speakers must now share parks and other public places with
governmental speakers. Under a modified categorical approach, a
public park in which there is no, or perhaps minimal, governmental
expressive conduct would presumably remain a traditional public
forum.106 In these forums content-based regulations of private
speech would be subject to strict scrutiny and time, place, and
manner restrictions would receive a form of intermediate scrutiny.
However, as monuments and more permanent forms of
governmental communication are added to the property, public
forum principles would gradually be displaced.
Where transitory private speech occurs in proximity to
governmental speech, a mixed public-private forum might develop.107
In such a forum, private speech rights may depend in part on
whether officials will be allowed to regulate or even exclude speech
that is incompatible with the substance of the proximate
governmental message. Moreover, depending on the size of the
public park or other space, insofar as the government is entitled to
displace or suppress private speech that is not compatible with its
own, a governmental forum may develop. In these forums only the
government’s message would be permitted.108 Free Speech Clause
limits would not apply in such forums.
complications may arise “[a]s mementoes and testimonials pile up,” but failing to suggest any
limit on governmental “chatter” in public places).
106. I am focusing on the type of expression at issue in Summum rather than the more
typical government speech (road signs, instructions, etc.) because this speech is the most likely
to conflict with the speech of private individuals seeking access to the public places at issue.
107. See Corbin, supra note 65 (discussing “mixed” public-private speech).
108. Cf. Bezanson, supra note 9, at 809 (describing the government speech doctrine as a
“government speech forum doctrine”).
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Under this modified categorical approach, the mixed and
governmental forums would essentially expand the circumstances
under which officials may limit or even prohibit private speech in
what once were considered traditional public forums. A traditional
public forum such as a municipal park could be carved into sections,
only some of which are fully open to private speakers, or could be
closed to all private speech by virtue of the presence of government
speech.
This sort of regulatory control is implicit in Summum’s
government speech rationale. Officials may be able to create
regulatory exclusions through governmental adoption, exclusion and
identity expression. As Randall Bezanson and William Buss inquired
well before Summum was decided: “Is it conceivable . . . that the
awarding of municipal parade permits by a city official—long a
government act subject to the strictest of First Amendment
scrutiny—might be recharacterized from a regulatory act to be an
instance of government ‘free speech activity,’ that involves the
‘exercise of editorial discretion in the selection and presentation
of . . . programming’”?109 Following this logic, suppose a
municipality erected, along a large expanse of a local public park, a
permanent memorial to U.S. troops serving in foreign conflicts.
Would the city be entitled to deny a permit for an anti-war rally in or
near that same space on the ground that it conflicts with the city’s
own message?110
Moreover, as noted earlier, the permanent-transitory distinction
the Court relied upon may not be so easy to cabin or administer.111
The Court did not address whether somewhat less permanent
displays, such as public festivals and other cultural events, would be
subject to the government speech adoption or attribution principle.
Does a Super Bowl display on the National Mall convey the
government’s message or that of its private organizers? Does
“Fashion Week” in New York City express municipal support and
109. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 46, at 1443 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998)).
110. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN
BAG 2D 413, 426–27 (2009) (expressing concern that Summum will permit governments to
adopt demonstrations as their own on the basis of viewpoint and thus engage in “clearly
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination”).
111. See id. (“Perhaps a distinction could be drawn between permanent monuments, as
in Summum, and transitory speech, such as demonstrations. It is impossible to explain, though,
why this is a distinction that would matter under the First Amendment.”).
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adoption of the fashion industry’s message? If these and other
displays communicate governmental messages, is the government
privileged to prefer them over other private events also seeking a
permit for the same space?
Summum may give rise to demotion, adoption of a modified
categorical approach, and confusion of regulatory acts with
expressive ones. The logic of the decision expands the circumstances
under which officials can contend that the public forum doctrine and
its attendant content-neutrality rules do not apply.
C. Public Forums and Governmental Identity
In most First Amendment decisions, the “place” where speech
and assembly occur lurks somewhere in the background.112 Although
it is an obvious fact that place is critical to expressive liberties in a
variety of respects, it is often ignored or addressed only superficially.
The idea that public places are merely legal properties is deeply
entrenched in the public forum and time, place, and manner
doctrines.113 Public properties are managed, controlled, and
conveyed. As bundles of legal rights, they are often treated as if they
communicate legal ownership but express little else.
One is therefore tempted to applaud Justice Alito’s effort to
engage the human geography and spatial sociology of the
monuments and the public park at the center of the dispute in
Summum. The effort at least signifies recognition that public places
such as parks, plazas, and squares are not merely inert spaces. They
are more akin to public canvases. The ultimate question, of course, is
for whose benefit such canvases exist and are to be maintained.
The Court’s suggestion that governmental entities speak not just
in parks and other public places but also through them goes directly
to the heart of that question. According to the Court, Pioneer Park
conveyed a municipal image or identity.114 I have already criticized
the idea that parks and other public places ought generally to be
conceptualized as vehicles or canvases for official identity claims
rather than private ones. In addition to the sociological problems
with this characterization, the implications for the public forum
concept are grave indeed.
112. ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 40, at 8–9.
113. Id.
114. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133–34 (2009).
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Under Summum’s identity conception, governmental entities
could claim that parks, streets, classrooms, museums, subway
platforms, university campuses, municipal buildings, public meetings,
municipal websites, and other places are not public forums but
tangible expressions of a governmental identity or image. Any private
speech that is not consistent with that preferred image or identity
would be subject to exclusion under the government speech
principle. The government’s identity claims would be immune to
public forum and content-neutrality principles.
For those who think the argument farfetched or the danger that
public forums will be swallowed whole by governmental identity
claims nonexistent, I would note that the reasoning has not only
been cited by litigants but has influenced some judges. Consider, for
example, the recent contest involving public speech in Berger v. City
of Seattle.115 The case involved a dispute concerning speech and
assembly near the Seattle Center, an eighty-acre public space
containing museums, sports arenas, theatres, the Space Needle, and
thirty-two acres of public parkland.116 The Director of the Seattle
Center promulgated a set of rules governing the use of its outdoor
spaces.117 Among other things, the rules required that street
performers obtain a permit prior to performing, prohibited active
solicitation, limited the locations for performances, and banned
performances within thirty feet of a “captive audience.”118 “Magic
Mike” Berger, a street performer, challenged several of the rules on
free speech grounds.119 A majority of the en banc Ninth Circuit
invalidated some of the new rules on the ground that they failed to
meet time, place, and manner standards.120
In dissent, however, Chief Judge Kozinski, writing for himself
and Judges Gould and Tallman, expressly relied upon the Summum
language and rationale regarding municipal identity claims.121 The
Chief Judge argued that Seattle had a “legitimate—indeed a vital—
interest in maintaining the character of the multi-use facility that is

115. 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
116. Id. at 1034–35.
117. Id. at 1034.
118. Id. at 1034–35.
119. Id. at 1034.
120. See id. at 1040–42 (invalidating permitting requirements); id. at 1053 (invalidating
passive solicitation rule); id. at 1056–57 (invalidating “captive audience” rule).
121. Id. at 1063–64 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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the crown jewel of its civic enterprise.”122 He was particularly
concerned that if the majority, which had upheld most of the
contested rules, was correct in its analysis, “then Seattle and other
municipalities hoping to use their parks to promote civic virtue,
neighborliness, hospitality and the peaceful enjoyment of the arts cannot
possibly draft a set of rules that will protect visitors, concessionaires
and other artists from overly aggressive street performers bent on
increasing their own visibility and income by bullying those around
them.”123
Chief Judge Kozinski claimed that because the Seattle Center
“play[s] an important role in defining the identity that [the] city
projects to its own residents and to the outside world,” misbehavior
by street performers had to be addressed through rules that might
not be appropriate in other circumstances.124 He argued that
misbehavior by street performers “who are a constant presence” (like
“Magic Mike”) was a “disaster in the making” because it interfered
with a public space that was intended “to delight and inspire the
human spirit in each person and bring us together as a rich and
varied community.”125 Further, Chief Judge Kozinski noted that
street performers fell somewhere in between the permanent
monuments addressed in Summum and more transient speakers.126
He claimed that this gave the city “a far greater interest in regulating
the activities of permanent street performers than occasional political
or religious speakers.”127
In short, three judges would have held that what they regarded
as the street performer’s bad public behavior was inconsistent with
the image and identity of the Seattle Center, which according to the
Chief Judge was one of “civic virtue, neighborliness, hospitality and
the peaceful enjoyment of the arts.”128 Moreover, as I mentioned
earlier, Summum did not address less-transient private speech like
that of street performers. Chief Judge Kozinski’s opinion suggested
that insofar as such speech might interfere with the government’s
own identity claim, it could be restricted pursuant to the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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government speech principle. Although the Chief Judge’s position
did not represent a majority view, it follows directly from Summum’s
identity principle. If, as Summum suggests, public parks speak on
behalf of governments, then private speech that interferes with or is
contrary to such messages may be excluded from what is otherwise a
traditional public forum.
That proposition, if accepted, would cast doubt upon the free
speech rights of almost any dissenting or contentious voice in a park
or other public place. For what municipality does not wish to convey
a message of “civic virtue, neighborliness, hospitality and . . .
peaceful enjoyment”?129 If municipal officials can deny access to
public forum properties on the ground that the proposed activities
are contrary to the city’s own identity claims or preferred imagery, a
wide range of public speech activities could be imperiled. Suppose,
for example, that a historic public pavilion is constructed in the town
square as a celebration of emancipation. Further suppose that the
town has tried for decades to overcome the racial divisions of its past.
The Ku Klux Klan applies for a permit to hold an event at the
pavilion, during which it plans to fly a Confederate flag and to
denounce integration. May the town deny the permit on the ground
that the proposed activity is inconsistent with the message and
overall mission of the town and its pavilion? Similarly, may a
municipality restrict the use of a public park on July 4th to preferred
“patriotic” activities?130
Although my primary concern is with more traditional public
forums, Summum’s governmental identity principle may turn out to
have a broader impact. Even websites might be characterized as
vehicles for municipal identity claims.131 For example, in Sutliffe v.
Epping School District, the First Circuit held that a town’s action in
setting up a website and choosing not to allow certain hyperlinks
constituted government speech.132 By deciding which links to
permit, the court reasoned the town had “engaged in its own
expressive conduct”133 and “conveyed an important government

129. Id.
130. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 46, at 1423.
131. For a discussion of this and other government speech issues relating to new
technologies, see Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 899 (2010).
132. 584 F.3d 314, 329 (1st Cir. 2009).
133. Id. at 330.
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message about the identity of the city.”134 As in Summum, the court
did not specify what the town’s selection or adoption of links actually
communicated. Although the town presumably intended to
communicate information about itself, nothing more specific was
mentioned. Having determined that the choice of links was
government speech, the court did not apply public forum or other
First Amendment doctrines. Indeed, it concluded that the public
forum doctrine, which arose in the context of real physical properties
such as streets and parks, was “not a natural fit”135 in the context of
website speech. Rather, the court extended the government speech
doctrine to any “communication channels” with regard to which the
government exercises some selection discretion.136
In dissent, Judge Torruella expressed concerns that there were
no “limiting principles” with respect to the nascent government
speech doctrine and that governments could (ex post) repackage
viewpoint discrimination as municipal speech.137 He too questioned
whether the government speech doctrine might apply even to
parades or other official events.138 Judge Torruella rejected the
town’s argument that those who disagree with the government’s
message or its exercise of discretion could always vote officials out of
office. Reliance on political safeguards would be hampered, he
argued, by allowing the government to “silence opposition by
narrowing the fora in which opposing views may be expressed.”139
Judge Torruella would have allowed the jury to determine whether
the town had designated a forum for speech on the municipal
website and had engaged in viewpoint discrimination.140
Though few in number, these cases demonstrate the difficulty in
narrowing Summum’s vocality principles to permanent monuments
in public parks. Once public places are understood to speak to or
communicate governmental identities, preservation of those
identities will predictably be relied upon to support restrictions on
private speech in public places. If governmental identity and image
principles apply in physical forums, then why not also in new forums
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

2232

Id.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 337 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339.

DO NOT DELETE

2203

3/8/2011 4:30 PM

Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum

where public forum principles may not seem like “a natural fit”
anyway? In short, on closer examination, Summum looks less like a
narrow decision about permanent monuments and more like a
decision which could have serious consequences for private speech in
public forums.
IV. MANAGING GOVERNMENT SPEECH CLAIMS IN PUBLIC PLACES
I have raised a variety of concerns regarding the manner in which
Summum may undermine public forum principles, particularly as a
result of its analysis of the vocality of public places. It is too soon to
tell what, if any, lasting impact Summum may have on the public
forum or on private speech rights in such places. But it is not at all
premature to think about steps courts and officials might take to
avoid the most troubling implications of Summum’s government
speech analysis.141 In one sense, Summum merely highlights aspects
of the government speech doctrine that commentators have been
concerned about for some time. However, in light of the special
context in which it arose, Summum also raises some unique
problems.
A. Public Forum as a Presumptive Doctrine
The path from Hague to Summum charts a precipitous decline
with respect to the concept of the public forum. Summum and a few
subsequent lower court decisions suggest that the government
speech doctrine may displace the public forum doctrine, or at least
severely limit the contexts in which it will be the central focus—even
in what would otherwise be considered traditional or quintessential
public forums. The threshold question will no longer be what kind
of place a speaker or assembly seeks to occupy, but whether the
speech in question is properly considered “public” or “private.” In
other words, questions regarding who is speaking rather than where
speech is taking place may come to predominate.
141. I disagree with those who claim that democratic limits, in particular exercise of the
franchise, are the only limits that will make a meaningful difference in stemming the rise of the
government speech doctrine. See Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A
Clash Between Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 147–48 (2010)
(claiming that “the government speech doctrine is unlikely to be limited by the court, except
in the most exceptional circumstances where there is an explicit constitutional limit on
government speech like the Establishment Clause or an exercise of government speech that
threatens the functioning of the democratic system itself”).
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Public forum categorization is a notoriously messy endeavor.
Courts have long struggled to distinguish among traditional,
designated, limited, and non-public forums. After Summum, courts
may be tempted to conclude that public forum principles are “out of
place” or “not a natural fit” and to turn instead to government
speech principles.142 While it may be simpler to analyze the status of
a speaker than the characteristics and functions of various public
places, the government speech principle offers little doctrinal
improvement at a potentially substantial cost to private speech and
assembly rights in public places.
This is due, in part, to the rather extraordinary lack of clarity
regarding what qualifies as “government speech.” Commentators
have noted that the Supreme Court “seems largely to be operating
on an intuitive, even inchoate, sense of what government speech
is.”143 As these commentators have correctly observed: “If
government may be treated as a First Amendment speaker, virtually
every regulatory act of government could be transformed into an act
of government expression, and then sheltered from attack under the
shield of the First Amendment.”144 Summum implicates, and may
even exacerbate, this problem in the context of public places that
have traditionally served as outlets for private speech and assembly.
Under the vocality principles described in Summum, things, places,
and events as varied as permanent monuments in a public park, the
Seattle Center, a public pavilion, a parade, and even speech at a town
hall meeting might all be characterized as forms of government
speech.
I am certainly no defender of the public forum doctrine.145
Regardless of how deeply flawed it may be, however, we ought not
to replace the public forum doctrine with the emerging government
speech privilege. Although it may indeed be out of place in some
situations, the public forum doctrine ought to at least operate as a
default doctrine in cases raising a conflict between private speech and
government speech in public places. At a minimum, for the reasons
stated earlier, courts should review with special care any efforts to
142. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009); Sutliffe, 584 F.3d
at 334 (majority opinion).
143. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 46, at 1436.
144. Id. at 1442 (emphasis omitted).
145. See ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 40, at 53–59 (criticizing the judicial
“bureaucratization” of public places under the public forum doctrine).
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demote or partition public forums, avoid treating regulatory acts as
government speech, and reject the notion that public places
themselves convey governmental identities that can displace private
speech and assembly. All of these things pose unique threats to
private speech and assembly in the traditional public forum.
As courts and commentators have noted, the government
speech principle threatens to mask or obscure content and other
forms of government discrimination.146 Unlike the government
speech principle, when properly applied, public forum principles
constrain or check governmental regulation of speech at least to
some degree. Had Sutliffe been resolved under ordinary public
forum principles, the court could have determined that the website
was a non-public forum and that the exclusion of links other than
those it had posted on the site was both reasonable and viewpointneutral. However, by characterizing the website links as
“government speech” that facilitated conveyance of the town’s
identity message, the court bypassed these questions entirely. As the
government speech realm expands, the contexts in which viewpoint
neutrality is required will obviously contract. The public forum
doctrine at least requires that the neutrality question be asked and
answered, even where the forum is determined to be non-public.
As Sutliffe also suggests, expansion of the government speech
doctrine at the expense of forum doctrine may also limit speakers’
access to new public forums. Owing to certain of its own faulty
premises, including the principle that new places cannot be
considered traditional public forums, the public forum doctrine
already limits opportunities for expanding access to public places.147
Government speech principles leave even less room for expansion.
For example, public websites may still be categorized as designated
public forums, thereby permitting some public access. However, as
Sutliffe demonstrates, one can reach that conclusion only by applying
public forum principles all the way through. The court discovered
what it believed to be a better fit in the government speech doctrine.
The government speech doctrine offered a way out of the difficult
task of categorizing the place in question and adjudicating viewpoint
146. See, e.g., Sutliffe, 584 F.3d at 337 (Torruella, J., dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra
note 110, at 426–27.
147. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(noting the importance under public forum categorization of the history and tradition with
respect to expression in a particular place).
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neutrality. As a result, however, citizens were denied even the
opportunity to demonstrate that the website could and should
accommodate their speech.
It is particularly imperative that courts reject the proposition that
public places may be designated as symbols of governmental identity
and hence treated in effect as governmental forums. That principle,
more than any other, threatens to eliminate the public forum
concept. Governments cannot by regulation set the tone of public
debate by insisting on “civil” public places and a “neighborly”
environment.148 Nor should they be allowed to do so by the simple
act of maintaining public places. Contrary to Summum’s suggestion,
courts ought to continue to view public places like parks and plazas
as public forums open to private assembly and expression.
Summum highlights the need to maintain judicial focus on place
rather than speaker status or source. Whatever faults the public
forum and time, place, and manner doctrines possess, at least under
these longstanding principles the government may not engage in
outright discrimination against disfavored speakers. By contrast,
under the government speech principle, official biases are not only
permissible but entitled to preemptive effect and immunity.
B. The Government, Like Any Other Speaker
Courts that are still inclined to apply government speech
principles in public places despite the foregoing concerns ought to
ensure that free speech immunity is warranted. One of the jarring
incongruities present in Summum’s analysis of speech in the public
park is that the Court essentially gave a pass to governmental
speakers insofar as it did not require that they identify any particular
messages they seek to communicate.
As noted earlier, a private speaker who cannot identify what
message he purports to communicate in a public place stands little
chance of mounting a successful First Amendment claim. For
example, in a recent case involving a religious group that challenged
a restriction on its practice of feeding the homeless in public parks, a
federal appeals court held that the group’s activities did not convey
any discernible message and therefore no Free Speech Clause issue

148. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (arguing that government has
no right to “cleanse public debate”).
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was properly raised.149 Thus, although both governmental and
private speakers may be engaged in expressive conduct, only the
latter appear to be subject to the requirement that their messages be
identified and understood by some audience.
As several commentators have argued, if governmental entities
are to have the benefit of Free Speech Clause immunity when they
purport to speak, they ought to at least be required to identify their
purported messages.150 Particularly where their speech is to be given
preemptive effect, governments ought to be required to demonstrate
that they are seeking to engage in some form of public discussion
and communication. In short, the government, like any other speaker
in a public place, ought to be required to show not only that it
intends to communicate a message, but that an audience would
likely understand its substance.
Summum essentially excused officials from making this showing
in the specific context of public monuments in public parks. But not
all monuments are non-text-based and hopelessly indeterminate.
There is no reason why courts cannot demand the proposed showing
in other contexts.
C. Public Places and Constitutional Obligations
As Stephen Smith has recently suggested, we may not find
answers to government speech problems in Free Speech Clause
principles and doctrines.151 The “big problem,” as Smith says, is “the
collapse of any working consensus about the proper domain and
functions of government.”152 As Summum demonstrates, this
observation applies to the management of public properties.
149. First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F.3d 1274, 1282–83 (11th
Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010).
150. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 599 (2008) (“[G]overnment can establish its entitlement to the
government speech defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that expression both
as a formal and as a functional matter. In other words, government must expressly claim the
speech as its own when it authorizes or creates a communication and onlookers must
understand the message to be the government’s at the time of its delivery.”) (emphasis
omitted); see also, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 46; Corbin, supra note 65; Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 35 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005).
151. Steven Douglas Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary
Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945 (2010).
152. Id. at 946.
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That does not mean we should not try to preserve the public
forum doctrine in an effort to protect private speech rights in public
places. But ultimately we have to ask: what is the proper role of
government with respect to public forum and other properties? Are
they, as the Summum decision and Chief Judge Kozinski’s Berger
dissent suggest, public assets through which officials communicate
messages such as civic virtue or an image of neighborliness? Or are
they critical constitutional assets that ought to be preserved for even
contentious private speakers such as protesters and street performers,
and in which a diversity of religious and other viewpoints are on
display?
Although the Court characterized the issue as one of
government speech, the question in Summum is actually less about
communication than it is about the management of public
properties. As governments have been pressed to meet constitutional
neutrality requirements, they have increasingly responded by altering
or manipulating the relationship between public property and private
rights.153 As I have argued at length elsewhere, public places like the
park in Summum are held in trust for the public and ought to be
maintained on a neutral basis for its benefit.154 Until that
fundamental principle is acknowledged and respected, officials and
courts will continue to chip away at public space through, among
other things, spatial tactics that limit assembly and dissent,
privatization of public venues in the face of Establishment Clause
and other constitutional challenges, and the application of the
government speech doctrine.155
Ideally, of course, the public space commons would facilitate
many kinds of expressive and religious activities. Governments ought
to be able to convey historical and other information to the public.
Members of the public ought to be able to sit on a public bench and
read poetry. Public protesters and those engaged in street theatre
ought to find space for their activities. The public forum and time,
place, and manner doctrines are partially intended to mediate these
153. See generally Zick, Property As/And Constitutional Settlement, supra note 13
(discussing instances in which religious and expressive liberties have been affected by
privatization of public properties).
154. Id.
155. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 47, at 590 (noting that a “precise
geometry of place has begun to fashion an expressive topography that limits, confines, and
controls protest and dissent”); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813–14 (2010) (describing
steps taken by Congress to preserve a cross on public land).
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sometimes conflicting uses. By contrast, spatial tactics like expressive
zoning, privatization of public properties, and assertions of
government speech immunities are not designed to mediate so much
as control or commandeer public places for the government’s own
benefit.
The government speech doctrine has developed in complicated
circumstances involving metaphysical forums, governmental
programs in which neutrality may be difficult or impossible to
achieve, and the placement of religious symbols on public property.
This is no coincidence. Indeed, it is a mistake to view the attempted
privatization of federal property upon which a stand-alone cross is
located in Salazar v. Buono and the governmental “adoption” of the
permanent monuments in Summum in isolation.156 Rather, these are
merely the latest means by which officials have sought to avoid or
settle constitutional challenges relating to public places.157 Viewed in
this context, calling a monument “government speech” is simply
another means of avoiding demanding constitutional neutrality
obligations.
Instead of engaging in esoteric debates regarding the
government’s capacity to speak in public forums, we ought to have a
serious debate about the functions these properties serve and how we
expect governments to manage them. Governmental ownership
comes with certain powers—i.e., to devise, exclude, and regulate.
However, legal ownership is not the same as constitutional
ownership. Public forums, particularly traditional ones, are not
reserved solely for uses the majority of the people and their
representatives find appealing or acceptable. The street performing
bully has at least as much right as the bench-sitter to use the park.
Indeed, the bully, assuming he is not otherwise violating the law, has
a First Amendment right to be there owing to his expressive activity.
Parks and other public places exist in part to facilitate challenges to
governmental identities and official efforts to compel conformance.
Moreover, rather than seeking ways to avoid religious neutrality
obligations, officials ought to be looking for ways to meet them by
working to accommodate a diversity of faiths in public places. If the
156. See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813 (describing sale of public property upon which a Latin
cross sits).
157. See generally Zick, Property As/And Constitutional Settlement, supra note 13
(describing means of purporting to settle constitutional contests through property dispositions
from the civil rights era to the present).
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neutrality rules are themselves deemed too onerous, there are judicial
and other means of challenging and perhaps changing the
constitutional baselines. So long as they exist, however, we ought to
expect governments to try to meet them rather than to continue
searching for new methods of subterfuge and avoidance.
Governments will likely continue their efforts to preserve public
tranquility and sectarian symbols in public places. What we need is a
meaningful debate regarding whether spatial tactics, privatization,
and government speech principles satisfy the requirements of
constitutional stewardship of public places.
V. CONCLUSION
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum is a remarkable decision in many
respects. It represents many firsts: first to hold that public forum
doctrine is out of place in a public park; first to treat a park as a
channel of governmental speech; and first to engage the
communicative aspects (the vocality) of public place. Because the
Court dispatched the public forum doctrine so quickly, one might
think the decision has nothing much to say about the concept or
status of the public forum. To the contrary, a close reading of
Summum shows that the decision’s analysis and rationale may have a
substantial effect on private speech rights in public places. The
government speaker is not like any other speaker in a park or other
public place. Its voice is louder, and its right to remain is stronger,
than that of any private speaker. Most importantly, government
speakers have the power to exclude other voices.
It is particularly unfortunate that the Court’s first foray into the
complex realm of spatial vocality was on behalf of government rather
than private speech. The Court’s conception of public places as
channels of government speech, its heavy reliance on the analogy of
private property ownership, and its suggestion that public places
convey governmental identity claims threaten to undermine
fundamental tenets of the public forum concept. Although we will
have to wait to discover the true extent to which it alters the balance
of power and rights in traditional and other public forums, there are
already some signs that official speech may limit and distort private
speech in public forums.
It is thus imperative that courts continue to ask place or forum
questions rather than rely upon amorphous government speech
principles. With regard to the public forum doctrine, better the devil
2240
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we know than the “recently minted” devil we don’t.158 Better also
that courts, if they are inclined to apply the government speech
immunity, first demand that governments identify their purported
messages and also reject the notion that public places can ever
themselves constitute government speech. I do not pretend that
these proposals will suffice to preserve the public forum. Ultimately,
that will require a commitment by officials to meet rather than avoid
difficult constitutional neutrality requirements.

158. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).

2241

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2242

3/8/2011 4:30 PM

2010

